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M’Culloch in Context
Mark R. Killenbeck
M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark
opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise
implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional
judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact
“necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or
restrict the operations of the federal government. 1 Most scholarly
discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of
the decision.2 Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch
within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political
and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few
individuals have examined M’Culloch’s robust theory of national
power in the light of two other major cases decided in the same
Term, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward3 and Sturges
v. Crowninshield.4 Fewer still try to explain it by placing it within

Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. I
owe an immense debt to David Schwartz, who kindly invited me to be a part of the Wisconsin
“Schmooze” within which this article was initially presented. David, Sandy Levinson, Mark
Graber, and Yxta Murray have in turn made their papers from that extraordinary event
available to the Arkansas Law Review, for which both the Review and I thank them. Portions
of this article are based on, and in some instances are taken from, my book on M’Culloch,
cited in note 5. Those appear here with the permission of the University Press of Kansas.
1. See generally M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). There is
disagreement about the proper spelling of the case, with most opting for McCulloch. I prefer
the spelling actually used by the Court in its reports, which is itself incorrect, as the Cashier
of the Baltimore Branch of the Bank consistently identified himself as James William
M’Culloh.
2.
See, e.g., RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE N ATIONALISM: MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND AND THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 216
(2007) (stressing that M’Culloch articulates some of “the most enduring principles of
American constitutional law” even as he laments “that they were applied to the wrong case”).
This is neither the time nor the place to note some of the problems that infect an otherwise
excellent book. It is, however, appropriate to note that those wishing to reconsider M’Culloch
and its place in our constitutional order are well-advised to read with care a superb new study,
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL
AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019).
3. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
4. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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the contexts provided by other significant events of the time:
legal, economic, and political issues of which the Justices were
surely aware, the implications of which almost certainly
influenced the manner in which Chief Justice John Marshall
couched his opinion for the Court.5 Finally, virtually none
recognize that key aspects of M’Culloch did not actually break
new constitutional ground. 6
I will then focus on three things. The first will be the extent
to which Dartmouth College and Sturges provide important
contextual glosses on M’Culloch. For example, what can we
glean from Marshall’s take on the nature and scope of state
authority over its domestic institutions in Dartmouth College? In
a similar vein, what can be said about the manner in which
Marshall discusses “the opinion of Congress” on the subject of
“uniform” or “partial” laws on bankruptcy and/or insolvency in
Sturges? I will then examine events of the time that almost
certainly played a role in how the Court approached M’Culloch.
One of the reasons I continue to regard it as a landmark is that it
was fashioned in a political and social environment within which
major external issues made the Court’s support of the Bank and
affirmation of robust federal power especially remarkable and
significant. Finally, I will focus on the reality that two key aspects
of Marshall’s opinion in M’Culloch had actually been established
much earlier: implied powers, and deference to Congress.
Consistent with the manner in which he wrote most of his
opinions, Marshall does not acknowledge these precedents. Nor,
5. Ellis, for example, merely observes that M’Culloch was one of three major cases
decided in the Court’s 1819 Term, naming the other two but never discussing them. He also
simply mentions the Spencer Committee Report in passing, see ELLIS, supra note 2, at 197,
and characterizes John Taylor’s extensive attacks on M’Culloch as a harbinger of problems
for the institution of slavery as “a small attempt.” Id. at 141. At the risk of shameless selfpromotion, one exception is MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING
A N ATION (2006) [hereinafter SECURING A N ATION].
6. Indeed, few have explored the opinion with the rigor Sandy Levinson employs when
he argues that M’Culloch “bequeathed to us a completely muddled and perhaps
incomprehensible notion of ‘sovereignty.’” Sanford Levinson, The Confusing Language of
McCulloch v. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, 72
ARK. L. REV. 7, 29(2019). In a similar vein, few have established with the degree of
nuanced clarity that Mark Graber provides when states, and supports, the reality “that the
Supreme Court probably would have overruled McCulloch’s holding that the federal
government was constitutionally authorized to incorporate a national bank if a proper vehicle
for doing so had come before the court.” Mark A. Graber, Overruling McCulloch?, 72 ARK.
L. REV. 79, 80 (2019).
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for that matter, did any of the six individuals who argued the case
rely on them in the same manner that advocates would today.
They were nevertheless on the books, and it is worth exploring
what they said.

I. THE 1819 TERM
There is a general willingness to recognize that there were
three notable decisions rendered in the Court’s February, 1819
Term.7 In chronological order they were Dartmouth College,8
Sturges,9 and M’Culloch.10 Two questions might profitably be
asked. Did either Dartmouth College or Sturges lay foundations
for M’Culloch? And are there aspects of the two they are
especially notable in the light of what followed?
Dartmouth College was a small private school founded in
1769 by the Reverend Eleazor Wheelock via royal charter. Its
original purpose was to educate and convert young Native
Americans, a goal that was gradually expanded to include
instructing the residents of the State. The charter established a
trust fund overseen by a self-perpetuating board of trustees. As
described by Marshall for the Court, the net effect was to create
“a private eleemosynary institution, endowed with a capacity to
take property for objects unconnected with government, whose
funds are bestowed on individuals on the faith on the charter.” 11
The litigation that bears the college name was in turn triggered
7. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 291 (2001) (“The year 1819 was ‘the great term’ of the Marshall Court
and the high point as well of Marshall’s career as chief justice.”). Justice Story recognized
this at the time in a letter within which he characterized M’Culloch, Dartmouth College, and
Sturges as cases that would “probably” make the “next term of the Supreme Court . . . the
most interesting ever known.” Letter from Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Dec. 9, 1818),
in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH S TORY 312, 313 (William W. Story ed., 1851) [hereinafter
LIFE AND LETTERS].
8. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518. The case was actually argued during
the prior Term, on March 10 and 11, 1818, but the decision was not announced until February
2, 1819.
9. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122. Sturges was argued on February 8, 1819, and the
decision was handed down on February 17, 1819. For whatever reason, Wheaton chose to
place it ahead of Dartmouth College in his report volume.
10. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). M’Culloch was argued
over nine days, February 22 through March 3, 1819, with the decision announced on March
6th.’
11. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 630.
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when the New Hampshire legislature passed a measure in June,
1816 that would have transformed the college from a private into
a public institution.12 As Kent Newmyer has noted, that was
significant for both the college and the nation,
for it touched the sensitive nerve ends of political
conservatism and nascent industrial capitalism; the
continuation of unfettered private educational institutions
(many of which, like Dartmouth and Harvard, were
sympathetic to conservative principles and conscious of their
conservative responsibilities); and the power of democratic
state legislatures to meddle with private property and
regulate corporate rights. 13

Two sets of developments shaped the litigation. The first
were a series of disputes that broke out within the college
regarding its internal governance. The second grew out of the
ongoing split between the Federalists, who favored a strong
national government, and the party styled variously as the
Democratic Republicans or simply Republicans, which was
apprehensive about federal power and championed the need for a
robust conception of state rights and state sovereignty.
The events that gradually led to the Court began with internal
disputes within the college. Its board had gradually become
deeply divided over religious and political questions. 14 That,

12. For a comprehensive summary of the case and many of its documents, see JOHN
M. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE C AUSES AND THE S UPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1879) [hereinafter S HIRLEY]. For briefer treatments, see Editorial Note,
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, in 8 THE P APERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 217, 217-23
(Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995) [hereinafter MARSHALL P APERS]; 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE O LIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: T HE MARSHALL COURT AND C ULTURAL C HANGE, 1815-35, at 612-28 (1988)
[hereinafter MARSHALL COURT AND C ULTURAL C HANGE]. See also William Geyer North,
The Political Background of the Dartmouth College Case, 18 NEW ENGLAND Q. 181, 181
(1945).
13. R. Kent Newmyer, Daniel Webster as Tocqueville’s Lawyer: The Dartmouth
College Case Again, 11 J. AM. LEGAL HIST. 127, 130 (1967).
14. For a nuanced discussion of the background issues, see Steven J. Novak, The
College in the Dartmouth College Case: A Reinterpretation, 47 NEW ENGLAND Q. 550, 55051 (1974). Novak argues that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 1819 decision in favor of the trustees
was . . . a major victory for the cause of evangelical education.” Id. at 563. See also Eldon
L. Johnson, The Dartmouth College Case: The Neglected Educational Meaning, 3 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 45, 45-47 (1983) (discussing in particular the public/private divide in the early
nation); George Thomas, Rethinking the Dartmouth College Case in American Political
Development: Constituting Public and Private Educational Institutions, 29 STUD. AM. POL.
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combined with concerns about the college’s administrative
structure, made it a significant issue in the election of 1816. As
described by Professor White:
[P]olitical factionalism had re-emerged in New Hampshire
with the renaissance of the Federalist party after 1810, and
the Dartmouth College schism was seen as a debate between
Federalists, “the maintenance of chartered rights, and the
established religious order” on the one side and Republicans,
“reform in college management, and equality of religious
sects,” on the other.15

The Republicans prevailed in the election, which yielded both a
Republican majority in the legislature and a Republican
Governor, William Plumer.
Plumer had previously been a Federalist, but had shifted
allegiances to the Republicans and agreed that his obligation as
Governor was to “perpetuat[e] the republican majority in the
State.”16 The status and governance of Dartmouth became a focal
point for him. In his inaugural address he declared that “[t]he
college was formed for the public good, not for the benefit or
emolument of its trustees; and the right to amend and improve
acts of incorporation of this nature has been exercised by all
governments, both monarchical and republican.” 17
He
emphasized that the college charter was anathema to sound
Republican principles, observing that “[a]s it emanated from
royalty, it contained, as was natural it should, principles congenial
to monarchy.”18 He accordingly asked the legislature to “make
such further provisions as will render this important institution
more useful to mankind,”19 declaring that the College charter,
with its perpetual governance by a self-regenerating board of

DEV. 23, 23 (2015) (exploring in particular the implications of the case regarding separation
of church and state).
15. MARSHALL COURT AND C ULTURAL C HANGE, supra note 12, at 613.
16. Letter from Isaac Hill to William Plumer (Apr. 22, 1816), in LYNN W. TURNER,
WILLIAM P LUMER OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1759-1850 245, 245 (1962) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
17. William Plumer, Inaugural Address (June 6, 1816), reprinted in SHIRLEY, supra
note 12, at 105-06.
18. Id. at 105.
19. Id. at 107.
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trustees was “hostile to the spirit and genius of a free
government.”20
The legislature took up the invitation. In an act approved on
June 27, 1816 it declared that “knowledge and learning generally
diffused through a community, are essential to the preservation of
a free government” and professed as its goal that “the college of
the State may, in the opinion of the legislature, be rendered more
extensively useful.”21 This was supplemented by two additional
measures in December, 1816, the net effect of which, as Daniel
Webster argued on behalf of the College, was that “[i]f these acts
are valid, the old corporation is abolished, and a new one
created.”22
The incumbent trustees responded by filing an “action of
trover” seeking to recover “the book of records, corporate seal,
and other corporate property, to which the plaintiffs allege
themselves to be entitled.” 23 The case made its way to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, which sustained the legislation.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice William Richardson
emphasized the difference between private and public
corporations, those “created for the immediate benefit and
advantage of individuals,” 24 versus those “which are created for
public purposes.”25 Parsing both the royal charter and the New
Hampshire statutes, he declared that education was a ““matter[]
of public concern.”26 The newly styled Dartmouth University
was, accordingly, “[a] corporation, all of whose franchises are
exercised for public purposes” and, as such “a public
corporation.”27 The legislation was then proper, for “[a]ll public
interests are proper objects of legislation; and it is peculiarly the

20. Id. at 105.
21. Act of the Legislature of New Hampshire (June 27, 1816), quoted in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 539 (1819).
22. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 554. Webster was an alumnus of the
College. In an impassioned final statement, he famously declared that “as I have said, [it is]
a small college. And yet there are those who love it!” Peroration (Mar. 10, 1818), in 3 THE
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL P APERS 153, 154 (Andrew J. King ed., 1989)
[hereinafter WEBSTER LEGAL P APERS].
23. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 624.
24. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 115 (1817).
25. Id. at 116.
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id. at 117.

2019

M’CULLOCH IN CONTEXT

41

province of the legislature, to determine by what laws those
interests should be regulated.”28
The opinion did not, however, confine itself to the state
constitutional and statutory claims, which might arguably have
insulated it from review by the Supreme Court. Noting that the
plaintiffs had argued “that the charter of 1769 is a contract,” 29
Richardson also discussed whether the legislation in question
posed a Contracts Clause issue. He disposed of this by declaring
that the charter was did not fall within the meaning of the Clause,
which stipulates that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” 30 A “contract,” he
maintained, was “an actual agreement between parties, by which
something is granted or stipulated, immediately for the benefit of
the actual parties.”31 That did not include “grants of power and
authority, by a state to individuals, to be exercised for purposes
merely public.”32 Any holding to the contrary would pose great
problems, he averred, for “[i]f the charter of a public institution,
like that of Dartmouth College, is to be construed as a contract . . .
it will, in our opinion, be difficult to say what powers, in relation
to their public institutions, if any, are left to the states.”33 The
statutes in question were then valid “general legislation, in
relation to the common interests of all.” 34
A writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court and the case
was argued over two days in March, 1818. 35 No decision was
rendered by the close of the Court’s Term. 36 In the wake of that
the parties discussed various possibilities for bringing the issues

28. Id. at 120-21.
29. Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 132.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
31. Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 132.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 133-34.
34. Id. at 135.
35. The writ of error confined the Court’s jurisdiction to the Contracts Clause issue,
which bothered Justice Story. See Letter from Joseph Story to Jeremiah Mason (Oct. 6,
1819), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 7, at 323.
36. Nothing about the case appears in the reports for the 1818 Term. Professor White
notes that “Marshall announced on March 13, 1818, that the case would be continued until
the 1819 Term because some judges had not formed opinions and others were of different
opinions.” MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL C HANGE, supra note 12, at 615 (citing
Supreme Court Docket, Mar. 13, 1818).
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back to the Court in an alternate form. 37 They were accordingly
surprised when Chief Justice Marshall handed down an opinion
in favor of the College on the second day of the Court’s
subsequent Term, February 2, 1819. 38
Early in his opinion Marshall made it clear that the Court
took seriously both the Contract Clause and the principles for
which it stood: “On the judges of this Court, then, is imposed the
high and solemn duty of protecting, from even legislative
violation, those contracts which the constitution of our country
has placed beyond legislative control; and, however irksome the
task may be, this is a duty from which we dare not shrink.”39 The
charter establishing the College was, in turn, a contract within the
meaning of the Clause:
It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances
of this case constitute a contract. An application is made to
the crown for a charter to incorporate a religious and literary
institution. In the application, it is stated that large
contributions have been made for the object, which will be
conferred on the corporation, as soon as it shall be created.
The charter is granted, and on its faith the property is
conveyed. Surely in this transaction every ingredient of a
complete and legitimate contract is to be found. 40

Marshall conceded that “education is an object of national
concern.”41 But, recognizing how colleges and universities had
actually developed in the fledgling nation, he pointedly asked
“[i]s education altogether in the hands of government?” 42 In
particular, he posed a familiar argument, the slippery slope,
inquiring whether “every teacher of youth become[s] a public
officer, and do donations for the purpose of education necessarily
become public property, so far that the will of the legislature, not
37. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason (April 28, 1818), in
WEBSTER LEGAL P APERS, supra note 22, at 182 (noting that he had seen Justice Story who
is “evidently expecting a [new] case” and that “[t]he question we must raise in one of these
actions, is, ‘whether by the general principles of our governments, the State legislators be
not restrained from divesting vested rights?’”).
38. For an argument that it would have been better for all concerned if Marshall had
not done what he did, see Maurice G. Baxter, Should the Dartmouth College Case Have
Been Reargued?, 33 NEW ENGLAND Q. 19, 19, 34-36 (1960).
39. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625 (1819).
40. Id. at 627.
41. Id. at 634.
42. Id.
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the will of the donor, becomes the law of the donation?” 43
Corporations, he stressed, are “artificial being[s] . . . existing only
in the contemplation of law.” 44 They derived their nature and
status from the terms under which they are created, not simply on
the basis of performing some function that might be in the public
interest. “[T]his being does not share in the civil government of
the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created.” 45
The various acts of the legislature at issue, in turn, clearly
altered the original understandings enshrined in the charter and,
in doing so, impaired the obligations of the contract formed. The
legislation had attempted to transform a private college into a
public university. “The will of the State is substituted for the will
of the donors, in every essential operation of the college.” 46 This
was not, Marshall opined, an “immaterial change.” 47 The state
had “totally changed” the nature and character of the institution:
“It is reorganized; and reorganized in such a manner, as to convert
a literary institution, moulded according to the will of its
founders, and placed under the control of private literary men,
into a machine entirely subservient to the will of government.” 48
The state statutes were, accordingly, “repugnant to the
constitution of the United States, and so not valid.” 49
Marshall’s opinion was described as being for the Court, but
was not unanimously embraced. 50 In particular, Justice Story
filed a lengthy concurring opinion within which he emphasized
his preferred approach to the case: that the common law
governing corporations provided a strong, independent basis for
invalidating the New Hampshire statutes.51 “When a private
43. Id.
44. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
45. Id. See also id. at 638 (“The character of civil institutions does not grow out of
their incorporation, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects for which
they are created.”).
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 653.
49. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 715.
50. Justice Washington filed a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing many of the
same points that Marshall made. See id. at 654-66 (Washington, J., concurring). Justice
Johnson concurred without opinion, “for the reasons stated by the Chief Justice.” Id. at 666
(Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Livingston concurred, without opinion, “for the reasons
stated by the Chief Justice, and Justices Washington and Story.” Id. (Livingston, J.,
concurring).
51. Id. at 675 (Story, J., concurring).
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eleemosynary corporation is thus created by the charter of the
crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of the crown,
than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter
itself.”52 This was, as one of Story’s biographers noted, not a
disagreement with anything Marshall had said. Rather, it was an
attempt “to open the majority opinion to the broadest possible
construction.”53 As such, it served as part of Story’s general goal
of developing a “doctrine of public and private corporations,”
creating a “crucial bridge from private eleemosynary educational
institutions to the American business corporation.” 54
Certain aspects of the Marshall opinion are worth noting in
the light of what was to come. Clearly, the case affirmed
Marshall’s strong support for property rights, in particular the
need to protect them from the vicissitudes of state politics. As
Webster stressed in his argument before the Court, “[i]t will be a
dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these
institutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the
fluctuations of political opinions.” 55 Cynics might also suggest
that the result reflects a Federalist Marshall’s antipathy toward
measures promoted by Jeffersonian Republicans. 56 Marshall’s
concerns were, however, more general, seen in his assessment of
why the Contracts Clause was deemed necessary. “[I]t must be
understood as intended to guard against a power of at least
doubtful utility, the abuse of which had been extensively felt; and
to restrain the legislatures in future from violating the right to
property.”57
52. Id.
53. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH S TORY: S TATESMAN OF
THE O LD REPUBLIC 130 (1985).
54. Id. at 131.
55. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 599.
56. One interesting but little-known facet of the case was Jefferson’s support for the
approach that Governor Plumer outlined in his message to the legislature. In a letter to
Plumer, Jefferson condemned “[t]he idea that institutions established for the use of the
nation, cannot be touched nor modified.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Plumer
(July 21, 1816), in XV THE WRITINGS OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON 46, 46 (Andrew A. Lipscomb
& Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1905) [hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS ]. The notion that the
college charter was inviolable “may perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of a
monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself.” Id. This position was consistent with
the one taken by Jefferson twenty years earlier when Virginia attempted to take over the
property of a private academy. See James Morrison Hutcheson, Virginia’s “Dartmouth
College Case,” 51 VA. MAG. OF H IST. & BIOGRAPHY 134, 139 (1943).
57. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 628.
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Marshall also laid down important markers for his general
approach to the interpretation and application of the Constitution.
He noted, for example, that “[a]ccording to the theory of the
British constitution, their parliament is omnipotent.” 58 That was
not the situation in this nation, within which our Constitution
provided, via the Contracts Clause a “rule” that must be adhered
to “unless some plain and strong reason for excluding it can be
given.”59 That stricture, in turn, should be heeded “unless there
be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd, or
mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument,
as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an
exception.”60
Above all, Marshall affirmed the supremacy of the
Constitution and the Court’s interpretations of it, even where the
case involved a state domestic institution. He stressed that “[o]n
more than one occasion, the Court has expressed the cautious
circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of
such questions; and has declared, that, in no doubtful case, would
it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.”61
But this was not such a case. The college charter established
contractual relationships that must be protected. And “the
American people have said . . . that ‘no State shall pass any . . .
law impairing the obligation of contracts.’”62 The Court was
obligated, accordingly, to discharge its “high and solemn duty of
protecting . . . contracts which the constitution of our country has
placed beyond legislative control.” 63
Sturges in turn arose when Richard Crowninshield issued
two promissory notes to Josiah Sturgis in March, 1811. 64
58. Id. at 643.
59. Id. at 644.
60. Id. at 645.
61. Id. at 625. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.). 316, 423 (1819)
(“Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution . . . it would become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an
act was not the law of the land.”).
62. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 625.
63. Id.
64. Sturges is yet another case where spelling becomes an issue. As Charles Hobson
notes, the correct spelling is Sturgis, but the case title in the reports uses Sturges. Editorial
Note, Sturgis v. Crowninshield, in MARSHALL P APERS, supra note 12, at 243 n. 1. One of
the remarkable things about Sturges is that there are, at least that I have found, no articles
focusing on the case, although it is mentioned in passing in many. Details regarding it are
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Crowninshield was originally from Massachusetts, but had
moved his shipping business to New York City. 65 He became
insolvent and invoked a New York statute that allowed debtors to
be discharged once they assigned their property to their
creditors.66 Sturgis contested the claim, but Crowninshield
obtained his discharge in February, 1812. 67 He then returned to
Massachusetts, where he entered the textile business and
prospered.68 Sturgis sued in the United States Circuit Court in
Boston in 1816 to recover his debt. 69 The case was to be heard
by Justice Joseph Story, riding the circuit, and District Judge John
Davis.70 But they did not actually have the case argued, agreeing
to divide their opinions and certify it to the Supreme Court. 71
The first issue was whether the New York statute was valid.
Crowninshield’s main argument was that the Bankruptcy Clause,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, gave Congress the sole power to
make “uniform Laws . . . on the subject of Bankruptcies,
throughout the United States.”72 There were two problems.
Congress had not yet passed any such law. The question of
whether that mattered had in turn been litigated in at least two
others cases, within which two members of the Court riding the

taken from two sources: Editorial Note, Sturgis v. Crowninshield, in MARSHALL P APERS,
supra note 12, at 239-44, and MARSHALL COURT AND C ULTURAL C HANGE, supra note 12,
at 633-41.
65. Editorial Note, Sturgis v. Crowninshield, in MARSHALL P APERS, supra note 12,
at 241.
66. Id. at 239-44.
67. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122 (1819).
68. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A N ATION 439 (1st ed.
1996).
69. Id.
70. Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Great Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 877, 896
(1966); Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 319, 350 (2013); R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story on Circuit and a
Neglected Phase of American Legal History, 14 AM. J. LEGAL H IST. 112, 119 (1970).
71. This case is not reported in Federal Cases. For the background details, see
GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH S TORY AND THE R ISE OF THE S UPREME COURT 164
(1970). Dunne quotes a letter from William Prescott to Leverett Saltonstall to the effect that
“[Story] proposes that the Court shall divide and carry the case to the Sup. Court without
argument or opinion here.” Id.
72. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 192 (“[C]ounsel for the plaintiff contend, that the
grant of this power to congress [sic], without limitation, takes it entirely from the several
states.”).
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circuits, Justices Brockholst Livingston and Bushrod
Washington, had staked out diametrically opposed positions. 73
Writing for the Court, Marshall aligned himself with Justice
Washington.74 In an opinion that styled itself as unanimous but
was certainly anything but, he declared that “[i]t is not the mere
existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible
with the exercise of the same power by the States. It is not the
right to establish these uniform laws, but their actual
establishment, which is inconsistent with the partial acts of the
States.”75 The failure of Congress to act created a void that New
York was free to fill. The Constitution gave certain powers to the
national government, but “it was neither necessary nor proper to
define the powers retained by the States.”76 This meant that the
individual States, “in most respects, sovereign,” retained “almost
every legislative power . . . among others, that of passing
bankrupt laws.”77 Congress could, if it wished, alter that
legislative landscape. But “the right of the States to pass a
bankrupt law is not taken away by the mere grant of that power to
Congress, it cannot be extinguished; it can only be suspended, by
the enactment of a general bankrupt law.”78
This shifted the focus to second question: “Does the law of
New York, which is pleaded in this case, impair the obligation of
contracts, within the meaning of the constitution of the United
States?”79 Unlike bankruptcy, this was an area where the Court
did not write on a clean slate. Nine years earlier, in Fletcher v.
Peck,80 it had held that the State of Georgia could not pass a law
invalidating a series of land purchases authorized by a prior state

73. Compare Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 547 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5,509)
(Washington, J., holding that state laws on bankruptcy were invalid), with Adams v. Storey,
1 F. Cas. 141, 151 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66) (Livingston, J., holding that the same act
invoked by Sturgis was valid). Dunne observes that “Story . . . doubtless regretted being
unable to add anything new to the analysis [but] was in a tactical position to speed the issues
to a conclusion.” Dunne, supra note 70, at 164.
74. See generally Golden, 10 F. Cas. 542; Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196.
75. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196.
76. Id. at 193.
77. Id. at 192-93.
78. Id. at 196.
79. Id. at 197.
80. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
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statute. And just six days earlier it had again parsed that Clause
in Dartmouth College.81
The Court held in Fletcher that the land grants in question
were contracts. It acknowledged that Georgia would have been
within its rights to alter or rescind the grants were it “a single
sovereign power.”82 But that was not the case:
She is part of a large empire; she is a member of the
American union; and that union has a constitution the
supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes
limits to the legislatures of the several states, which none
claim a right to pass. The Constitution of the United States
declares that no state shall pass any . . . law impairing the
obligation of contracts.83

As was his wont, Marshall did not cite or discuss Fletcher or
Dartmouth College in Sturges.84 Instead, again as was his wont,
he penned a discussion on the importance and “inviolability of
contracts” which must “be protected in whatsoever form [they]
might be assailed.”85 Marshall rejected the contention that since
the New York measure was an insolvency law it was not within
the meaning of the Contracts Clause. “It is said . . . that laws
which merely liberate the person are insolvent laws, and those
which discharge the contract, are bankrupt laws.” 86 That did not
matter, given the underlying reality that Sturgis and
Crowninshield had negotiated and entered into a contract. 87 More
tellingly, Marshall argued that in a contest between the “spirit” of
the Constitution and its words, careful attention must be paid to
what the Constitution actually said:
“[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially that of a
constitution, is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the
spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words. It would be
dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic
circumstances, that a case for which the words of an

81. See generally Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819).
82. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
83. Id.
84. See generally Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122.
85. Id. at 200.
86. Id. at 194.
87. Id. at 198.
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instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its
operation.” 88

Marshall’s opinion has appropriately been described as a
compromise, an attempt to paste over deep divisions on the Court
in the face of his strong desire that it speak with a unified voice.
As Justice William Johnson would subsequently explain, “[t]he
Court was . . . greatly divided in their views of the doctrine, and
the judgment partakes as much of a compromise, as of a legal
adjudication.”89
That said, three elements of Surges merit our attention. The
first is its affirmation that the powers of Congress, although
arguably limited, are supreme: “That the power is both unlimited
and supreme, is not questioned.”90 The States, with their residual
sovereignty, may well have the ability to address the issue of
bankruptcies. But that authority was circumscribed by the reality
that the states are, as Fletcher stressed, “part of a large empire . . .
member[s] of the American union . . . that has a constitution the
supremacy of which all acknowledge[.]”91
Accordingly,
“[w]henever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress,
or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised
exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from
the State Legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to
act on it.”92
A second salient factor is that Congress enjoys substantial
deference regarding both whether it chooses to exercise its
powers and what it actually does. As Marshall observed, the
authority to enact a uniform bankruptcy code “is, like every other
part of the subject, one on which the Legislature may exercise an
extensive discretion.”93 Marshall recognized that there were
complications and “inconveniences” posed by the distinctions
between and among bankruptcy and insolvent laws. “It may be
88. Id. at 202.
89. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 272-73 (1827) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
90. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 192. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“If any one proposition should command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the Union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”).
91. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
92. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 193.
93. Id. at 195.
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thought more convenient, that much of it should be regulated by
State legislation, and Congress may purposely omit to provide for
many cases to which their power extends.” 94 But these were
matters best left to Congress. “[B]e this as it may, the power
granted to Congress may be exercised or declined, as the wisdom
of that body shall decide.”95
Finally, there is Marshall’s gloss on the interpretive process,
within which attention is paid to both the letter and spirit of an
admittedly general document, a Constitution that, as he would
subsequently observe, does not “partake of the prolixity of a legal
code.”96 As Marshall stressed:
[I]f . . . the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by
any other provision in the same instrument, is to be
disregarded, because we believe the framers of that
instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in
which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
in the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting that application. 97

Taken together, Dartmouth College and Sturges envision a
national government that is supreme within the spheres of its
operation, with its actions superior to those of states if and when
federal authority is “properly” invoked. 98 They also strongly
intimate that Congress should enjoy substantial deference in
making judgments about what is in the national interest and when,
and how, it should act to effectuate those interests. Finally, they
articulate an approach to constitutional adjudication that is highly
sensitive to the notion, most famously embraced in M’Culloch,
that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding,” a document that, if it attempted to account for every
possible situation and development “could scarcely be embraced
by the human mind.”99 In short, they both anticipate and flesh out
key aspects of what would follow in M’Culloch and, in doing so,
provide a more comprehensive account of the principles that

94. Id.
95. Id. at 195-96.
96. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
97. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 202-03.
98. See generally Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518; Sturges 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122.
99. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
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Marshall and his colleagues deemed important as they fashioned
a vision for the nation and articulated a role for the Court.

II. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS
No case is litigated in a vacuum. A lawsuit is brought within
the matrix provided by its particular facts and circumstances,
elements that vary even when different causes of action present
essentially the same legal questions. In a similar vein, each case
is pursued within and in the light of a wider social and political
context, within which multiple events and issues may well have a
bearing on how the litigation is viewed and resolved.
M’Culloch is a perfect example. The technical focus was
whether Congress had the authority to create the Second Bank of
the United States and whether the State of Maryland could tax its
operations. But those issues were litigated in an environment
within which at least three extrinsic factors had a potentially
profound influence on how Marshall and his colleagues
approached the case: the Panic of 1819, which many attributed to
the policies and actions of the Bank; the Bank itself, an institution
that was unpopular and corrupt; and the “Missouri Question,” a
euphemism of the time that was a place-holder for the issue of
slavery.

A. THE PANIC OF 1819
One of the arguments in favor of the Bank’s creation had
been that it would serve as an example to the state banks, a sound
institution backed by and able to pay in specie. 100 But both the
economic situation and the Bank’s own policies conspired against
it. As Bray Hammond stressed in his important study of banks
and banking, “[t]he Bank began business in the midst of
temptations on every hand to over-extend itself.”101 A “vast
business parade was forming” and “[i]n such a situation the
100. See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE PANIC 1819: REACTIONS AND POLICIES
7 (1962) (noting that the “monetary situation” in the wake of the War of 1812 “was generally
considered intolerable” and that the Second Bank was regarded as “an attempted solution,”
an institution that would “redeem its notes in specie, and was expected to provide a sound
and uniform currency”).
101. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE C IVIL W AR 257 (1957).
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restraining powers of a central bank were spurned. All that was
wanted was more steam.”102 The Bank “yielded,” to both greedy
stockholders pursuing profits and to “borrowers in general,”
adopting an “open-handed philosophy.”103
The administration of the Bank adopted policies that were
designed to allow it to compete with established state banks in
pursuit of economic expansion. 104 It also embraced an aggressive
rather than controlled approach to lending, in stark contrast to the
more measured policies followed by the First Bank. Taken
together, this meant that the Second Bank made too many loans
for paper currency, unbacked by specie (gold and silver). As a
result, its stocks of specie declined precipitously. That problem
was compounded by the fact that gold and silver became
increasingly scarce and, as a result, commanded a premium that
made their acquisition expensive. 105
This did not go unnoticed. In February, 1818, for example,
Niles Weekly Register observed that “[t]he time was when to the
name of a bank was associated the pleasant idea of an institution
bottomed upon solid capital, derived from men who had money
to spare, and conducted by men of high and honorable minds, on
just and liberal principles.”106 That had changed. “[T]he common
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. For detailed discussions of the Second Bank and its policies, see generally
RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED S TATES (1903); HAMMOND,
supra note 101; WALTER BUCKINGHAM SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK
OF THE UNITES STATES (1953).
105. For an alternate view, see Smith, supra note 104, at 113. Smith notes that both
William Jones, the first President of the Second Bank, and Nicholas Biddle, the third and last
President of the Bank attributed much of the blame to the federal government which,
according to Biddle, “urged and goaded” the Bank “into an enlargement of its business,”
such that “if fault there were, [it] belonged rather to the Government than to the Bank.” Id.
(quoting Biddle). See also Brutus, Bank of the United States No. IX, WEEKLY AURORA, Nov.
30, 1818, at 322 (arguing that “it is very perceptible, that general Hamilton apprehended
some dreadful calamity to the nation, should the management of the bank be conducted or
influenced by the government”); Brutus, Bank of the United States No. VI, WEEKLY AURORA,
Nov. 16, 1818, at 307 (“All these are objects connected and interwoven with one another,
the bank with the government, and the government with bank, like a complicated knot of
iniquity, whose different parts cannot be discerned or separated.”).
106. H. Niles, Editorial Address, NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, Feb. 28, 1818, at 2
[hereinafter Editorial Address]. Niles Weekly Register was one of the few truly national
publications at the time. It was published in Baltimore, a matter of no small importance in
terms of its awareness of and sensitivity to issued posed by the Bank in general and its
Baltimore branch in particular.
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idea of a bank now is, that has only a paper capital, manufactured
by [men] who, instead of being able to lend, really want to borrow
money, and conducted by men who prostrate every rule of right
to subserve their own personal views.”107 The focus of these
remarks was clear: the Second Bank, which “has already, in one
short year, exhibited a conduct in direct opposition to that which
was expected of it.”108
The combination of aggressive lending and a lack of specie
posed significant problems for the Bank. It was required by law
to pay specie for its notes and was subject to a twelve percent
penalty if it failed to do so, which would only make the situation
worse. These general difficulties were exacerbated by another of
the Bank’s mandates, paying the debts of the government, in
specie. One of those fell due in October, 1818, two million dollars
owed for the Louisiana Purchase. 109 That equaled the Bank’s
entire stock of specie at the time, and the government was forced
to go abroad, to London, to satisfy the obligation. 110
To its credit, the Bank’s administration realized that the
situation had become untenable and they began to curtail its
expansionist policies. In the summer of 1818 they ordered its
branches to have the state banks redeem the notes owed them. 111
This had a multiplier effect, forcing state banks to curtail their
activities and seek repayment of their debts so that they could
settle their accounts with the Bank. 112 The money supply
decreased substantially, provoking a rapid and dramatic drop in
prices. This overwhelmed the system. Bankruptcies multiplied
and by 1819 over three million individuals—one-third of the
population—were feeling the effects of the resulting depression,
which became known as the Panic of 1819.113
There has been a continuing debate about whether the Bank
and its policies caused of the Panic or were simply one of its
107. Id.
108. H. Niles, To Correct Abuses by the Bank, NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, March 7,
1818, at 23.
109. ANDREW H. BROWNING, T HE P ANIC OF 1819: T HE F IRST GREAT DEPRESSION
157 (2019).
110. SMITH, supra note 104, at 100.
111. Id. at 107-08.
112. Id. at 108.
113. For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and details of the Panic, see
generally Rothbard, supra note 100.
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precipitating forces.114 The best that can be said is that the Bank
exacerbated an already tenuous situation. In the alternative, and
more troubling, is the distinct likelihood that it initiated the chain
of events that produced the most severe economic dislocation in
the young nation’s history.
Regardless, public perceptions of the Bank declined. Its old
enemies acquired new ammunition and a new cadre of opponents
joined a growing national chorus that viewed the Bank “like the
plague of frogs, and other unclean things, inflicted on the
Egyptians.”115 The attacks launched by William Duane were
especially sharp. Duane was a staunch Republican. 116 The
newspaper he owned and edited, the Aurora, was described by
Thomas Jefferson as one that “has unquestionably rendered
incalculable services to republicanism thro’ all it’s struggles with
the federalists, and has been the rallying point for the orthodox of
the whole Union.”117 Widely circulated, the Aurora had great
influence and the views expressed by its publisher had a profound
impact in the body politic.
It was accordingly significant that Duane became a frequent
and pointed critic of the Second Bank. In September, 1818, for
example, he observed that
[i]t was long since imagined, even by those the least disposed
to suspect ill, in men, whom they ought to have known
incapable of better; that the measure of iniquity of the paper
bank managers, was full, even to overflowing. It was
deemed impossible, that they could go further, without
rousing public indignation to an open and decisive rebellion
against them, their corrupt bank, and their oppressive
measures.118

114.
Catterall, for example, states that the Bank’s “curtailments had, indeed,
precipitated the panic, for which, however, it was hardly more responsible than was Noah
for the flood.” CATTERALL, supra note 104, at 61.
115. H. Niles, Banks and Banking, NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, March 7, 1818, at 1.
116. For a discussion of Duane and his political views, see JEFFREY L. PASLEY, THE
TYRANNY OF PRINTERS: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE E ARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 176–
95 (2001); Kim T. Phillips, William Duane, Philadelphia’s Democratic Republicans, and
the Origins of Modern Politics, 101 PA. MAG. H IST. & BIOGRAPHY 365 (1977).
117. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt (Mar. 30, 1811), in 3 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 15, 15 (J. Jefferson Looney et al. eds., 2006).
118. Brutus, The National Bank—Against the People, WEEKLY AURORA, Sept. 21,
1818, at 213.
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As part of its economy measures, the Bank terminated its policy
that each branch must redeem the notes of the other branches. 119
The goal was to protect branches that had conservative credit
policies, mainly in the east, from those that had pursued unbridled
expansion, mainly in the south and west. Duane was outraged:
For even imagination revolts from the contemplation of an
act, which implies that last and blackest degree, of turpitude
and folly. What then was the astonishment, what the
indignation, and the embarrassment of the public, without
one exception of party, or social feelings, when the managers
of this swindling bank, refused to receive their own branch
notes on deposit, or in payment of debts to the bank itself?
When they refused to receive THEIR OWN NOTES?120

The criticisms were continuous and savage. He declared that
the policies embraced reflected “blundering stupidity.” 121 They
were the actions an “unprincipled fraternity of speculators” that
have produced “the complete prostration of our social and
political rights.”122 And he argued that “[i]f we endure this, I
repeat, in the existence of that corrupt spawn of all that is evil and
hateful to liberty, prosperity, and equal rights—the ‘national
bank’—we can no longer claim the character or exercise the
functions of freemen.”123
These observations were echoed in a number of publications
and by any number of critics who believed that the Bank was
responsible for the Panic of 1819. Hezekiah Niles, for example,
declared that “[t]he bank, like an abandoned mother, has most
imprudently BASTARDIZED its offspring, and deserves not the
countenance or support of honest people.” 124 The Bank was
accordingly repeatedly assailed as an institution whose priorities
and actions were adverse to the national interest. Duane, for
example, proclaimed in October, 1818 that “[a] great crisis
approaches . . . slow in its march, but deadly and relentless as the
yellow fever which desolated your cities.” 125 Niles agreed,
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Brutus, The Political Bank, WEEKLY AURORA, Sept. 28, 1818, at 250.
124. H. Niles, Banks and Banking, NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, Sept. 12, 1818, at 33.
125. SMITH, supra note 104, at 115 (quoting Brutus, WEEKLY AURORA, Oct. 19,
1818).
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declaring that “[t]he Bank of the United States has committed an
act of suicide;—whether it will cause its death or not, the doctors
at Washington city and at the seats of the several state
governments, will soon have to determine.” 126
Marshall and his colleague had to be aware of this. They
also almost certainly knew that a decision supporting the Bank—
“this bastard brat of treasonable vices” 127—would be viewed with
alarm. It was one thing to affirm the power of Congress to charter
a corporation that made positive contributions to the nation and
its economy, as had the First Bank. It was quite another to give
supreme judicial sanction to an institution that was responsible
for “the most extensive and ruinous bankruptcies . . . amongst us
that have ever befell any people.” 128 M’Culloch would,
accordingly, be roundly condemned as the work of a Court that
“sanction[ed] the most stupendous fraud ever recorded upon the
pages of history, and g[a]ve a legal reputation to this rank
colossus of corruption is. . . a problem, in the career of political
delinquency, which nothing short of a heart sickening prostitution
of principle can solve, or explain.” 129 The willingness of the Court
to chart the path it did in the face of all of this is, accordingly,
noteworthy.

B. MIS-, MAL- AND NONFEASANCE: THE
SPENCER REPORT
The issues posed by the Bank’s economic policies were not
the only ones that it faced. Its structure and operations provided
ample opportunities for individuals to exploit it for their own
personal gain. This was especially true at its Baltimore branch,
although it was not the only local office where corruption and
mismanagement occurred. 130 A number of the Bank’s board
members attempted to manipulate the price of Bank stock to their
advantage. This included its President, William Jones, who
126. H. Niles, Banks and Banking, NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, Sept. 12, 1818, at 33.
127. Brutus, The Bank System of Political Corruption, No. II, WEEKLY AURORA,
March 8, 1819, at 22.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Brutus, The Bank System of Political Corruption, No. V, WEEKLY AURORA,
March 27, 1819, at 35.
130. See CATTERALL, supra note 104, at 37-39 (discussing overall mismanagement);
id. at 42-50 (focusing on the activities of the Baltimore branch).
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bought and sold over two hundred thousand dollars’ worth of
stock, abetted by three Baltimoreans, who secretly purchased one
thousand shares of Bank stock which they then gave Jones, who
sold it at a profit of some eighteen thousand dollars. 131
The Baltimore activities were by far the most extensive, a
record of mis-, mal-, and nonfeasance that reflected a
combination of the manner in which the business community in
that city operated and the predilections of the men who would
oversee the operations of the Baltimore branch office. As John
Quincy Adams would subsequently observe, “there [wa]s not a
city in the Union which . . . had so much apparent prosperity, or
within which there has been such complication of profligacy.” 132
This atmosphere suited James William M’Culloh, who served as
the branch’s chief operating officer. 133 M’Culloh was both
personally and professionally ambitious. He was also a harsh
critic of the First Bank, which he believed had squandered many
opportunities, and argued that the Second Bank should not repeat
its mistakes.
The Bank of the United States must assume its stand, and,
supported by the Government, might improve the medium of
the country very essentially. The old bank did much to injure
it. . . . Instead of extending its operations so as to embrace
every real demand of commerce; instead of expanding its
views as the country and its trade grew, it pursued a timid
and faltering course, and invited, by its measures, the
erection of rival institutions to share its business, and
contaminate the character of this country’s medium.
That bank had a glorious field before it; and this has one
almost as much so, whilst it harmonizes with the
Government and meets every real call of commerce. 134

131. Id. at 32-41.
132. 4 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, The Department of State, in MEMOIRS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, 383 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875); see also CATTERALL, supra note
104, at 42 (“Baltimore at this time was the center of airy speculation and of all sorts of
characterless and illegitimate business.”).
133. M’Culloh’s formal title was Cashier. The spelling of his name, in turn, has
become a matter of controversy over the years. I am convinced that M’Culloh is correct,
based on manuscript documents found in various archives. For a discussion of M’Culloh’s
ruin and eventual redemption, see SECURING A N ATION, supra note 5, at 90-94, 184-90.
134. Letter from Jas. W. M’Culloh to William Crawford (Mar. 17, 1817), in 4
AMERICAN S TATE P APERS: F INANCE 774 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1858).
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It became clear, however, that these views were not widely
shared and that both the Bank’s and the government’s actions
were viewed with alarm. “In vain will this nefarious institution,
attempt through the connivance of a corrupt administration, to
shake off the overwhelming load of iniquity, that drags it down
the channel of popular odium, to final ruin and disgrace.” 135 The
constant criticism of the Bank could not be ignored. On
November 25, 1818 Representative John C. Spencer of New York
offered a resolution in the House of Representatives asking “[t]hat
a committee be appointed to inspect the books and examine into
the proceedings of the Bank of the United States, and to report
whether the provisions of its charter have been violated or not.” 136
Spencer stated that “[a]s to the necessity of the inquiry proposed,
he presumed there were few of those near him who were not
aware of the agitation which exists in the public mind on this
subject, and who did not perceive that, from one end of the
country to the other, loud complaints were made against the
conduct of the officers of the banks.” 137 He tied the need for an
investigation to the fortunes of the Bank itself. “The friends of
the bank,” he thought, “ought to solicit the inquiry proposed,” for
a “full and fair view of the whole subject, thus obtained, would
be attended with the most happy consequences to the nation and
to the bank.”138 And he emphasized that “no one could doubt the
utility of such an institution to the nation, if properly
conducted.”139
A request was made to give the House “time to reflect on
it,”140 and the matter was taken up again on November 30th. There
was an extended discussion about the economic situation, the
extent to which the Bank had fulfilled the roles promised by its
supporters, and the details of the proposed investigation.
Modifications were made to the original motion and a final
135. Brutus, Bank of United States, No. V., WEEKLY AURORA, Nov. 2, 1818, at 284.
136. MR. SPENCER’S RESOLUTION AND REPORT, 15TH CONG. (Nov. 25, 1818),
reprinted in M. ST. CLAIR C LARKE & D. A. HALL, LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 714 (Washington, Gals and Seaton 1832)
[hereinafter CLARKE & H ALL]. The Clarke and Hall volume is an invaluable resource for
those interested in the history of both the First and Second Bank.
137. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 318 (1818).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 319.
140. Id.
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version emerged that was designed to give the committee the
freedom to conduct an inquiry that would “embrace all the topics
respecting which the public mind had been agitated, and to obtain
a report thereon from a respectable committee of this House.”141
A five person committee was appointed, consisting of Spencer,
William Lowndes of South Carolina, Louis McLane of Delaware,
Burwell Bassett of Virginia, and a future President of the United
States who would play an important role in the long-term fate of
the Bank, John Tyler, also of Virginia. 142
The committee filed its report on January 16, 1819.143 It
indicated that the members had conducted a thorough
examination of the Bank’s books and had “interrogated, on oath”
officers and officials of the Bank at its headquarters in
Philadelphia and branch offices in Baltimore, Richmond, and
Washington.144 The committee stressed that its focus had been
on “the general management of the bank, and the conduct of its
officers, and those which were connected with the question of a
violation of its charter.”145
The first portion of the report recited the events that had
provoked the investigation. The committee observed that the
Bank had been in a position to do much good, noting that it had
the power to “coerce[]” the state banks “into a moderate and
reasonable reduction of their circulating notes.” 146 But the Bank
did not do that. Rather, it participated willingly in the general
rush to profit and acted only when it found itself in peril. Then,
its response was Draconian. As the report noted, “when the bank
began to call for specie, its demands were so considerable as to
not only expose the local banks, but the citizens in their vicinity,
generally, to very severe pressure.” 147
The committee accordingly placed much of the blame for the
resulting economic problems on the Bank. “The committee think
it evident . . . that the bank did not exercise, with sufficient
141. Id. at 327.
142. For a discussion of Tyler’s future role in the fate of the Bank, see SECURING A
NATION, supra note 5, at 177-79.
143. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 136, at 714-32 (containing the full committee
report); see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 552-80 (1819) (containing the full report).
144. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 552.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 553.
147. Id. at 554.
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energy, the power which it possessed, and might have retained,
but rather afforded inducements to the State banks to extend the
amount of their circulating notes, and this increased one of the
evils it was intended to correct.”148 It also criticized the conduct
of the branches, singling out Baltimore as one that “continued its
drafts and discounts, and drained the specie from the Northern
offices.”149 It concluded that the New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia “were, in fact, made tributary to Baltimore; and all
their means and energies were required to supply its extravagant
issues.”150 Baltimore had, in effect, “impoverished the Northern
offices, and the cities where they were established were made to
feel the pressure.”151
The report also emphasized that inappropriate, perhaps even
illegal conduct had occurred. It stressed that “[t]he effect of these
[actions] was, very obviously, to enable those who had made large
purchases to retain their stock without paying for it, and to declare
a benefit from its probable advancement in price.” 152 In
particular, substantial amounts of the Bank’s capital were “placed
beyond its control.”153 Many of “the loans actually made
were . . . unreasonable and excessive in their amount; they were
not made to the merchant and trader, but to a few persons
consisting of directors, brokers, and speculators; and have been
renewed and continued, almost invariably, at the option of the
borrower.”154 Indeed, “many of the directors, as well those
appointed by the Government as those elected by the
stockholders, appear to have been the most forward and the most
active in trafficking in stock.” 155
The report established quite clearly that there had been
substantial misconduct and violations of the Bank’s charter. 156
Nevertheless, it did not recommend any specific actions or
sanctions, believing that “the salutary power lodged in the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 555 (1819).
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 565.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 566 (1819).
Id.
Id. at 572-73 (detailing four violations of the Charter).
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Treasury Department will be exerted, as occasion may require,
and with reference to the best interests of the United States.”157
The report had an immediate and predictable effect. William
Jones was forced out as President in January, “resign[ing]”
shortly after he had been reelected to the position. 158 An interim
President, James C. Fisher, served until March, 1819, when
Langdon Cheves, the former Speaker of the House, assumed that
office.159 Cheves proved to be an able administrator and initiated
a number of needed reforms.160 These included a general
housecleaning, one of the victims of which would be James
M’Culloh, who was forced to resign from his position in May,
1819.161
The House took up the report and the issues it presented on
February 19, 1819, four days before the Court met to hear
arguments in M’Culloch.162 Two specific proposals were
considered. The first was a measure that had been introduced on
February 1st that asked the Attorney General to issue a scire
facias, a writ requiring the Bank “to show cause wherefore the
charter, thereby granted, should not be declared forfeited.” 163 The
second requested that the Committee on the Judiciary “be
instructed to report a bill to repeal” the Bank’s charter.164
These provoked extended debate, which came to an end on
February 25th, three days after the oral argument of M’Culloch
had begun. All of the Bank’s sins were paraded before the House
and the nation in an extended discussion that both praised the
Bank as “covered with virtues and perfection . . . occupying a
station almost superhuman” and condemned it as one that “was
not in a condition to respond to the confidence or business of the
country.”165 It was also quite clear that those engaging in that
debate knew they were not the only ones actively judging the
Bank. On the February 24th, for example, Representative David
157. Id. at 573.
158. SMITH, supra note 104, at 116.
159. Id. at 116-17.
160. For details of the Cheves regime, see HAMMOND, supra note 101, at 262-79;
SMITH, supra note 104, at 117-46.
161. SECURING A N ATION, supra note 5, at 194.
162.
34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1240 (1819); HAMMOND, supra note 101, at 264
(emphasis added).
163. CLARKE & H ALL, supra note 136, at 732-33.
164. 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1240.
165. Id. at 1394-95.
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Walker of Kentucky observed that “[h]ave we not got reasons to
believe, from the known complexion of a majority of the
members of the United States Supreme Court, that the court will
determine that the United States Bank have a right to extend her
branches over every individual State in the Union, and that the
States have no right to prune them?” 166
None of this could have escaped the notice of the Court. In
1819 Washington was a very small place. Its sole business was
government, and the three branches were acutely aware of what
each was doing. Indeed, the Court met in a smallish chamber in
the Capitol itself, barely separated from the House. 167 As Justice
Story observed in a letter to his mother, there was a “busy circle[]
of politics” within which the decisions of the Court “excite[] great
interest, and in a political view [are] of the deepest consequence
to the nation.”168
The proverbial bottom line is that in the early months of
1819 the Second Bank had been laid bare as a corrupt institution
unworthy of support. It was routinely attacked in both the halls
of Congress and the press. As Brutus stressed in mid-January,
1819, “[t]he system of paper fraud, and dishonest speculation . . .
has been so manifestly, so avowedly, licentious, vicious, and
unlawful, as to dispel all doubts, and take away all reservation, as
to the turpitude of those who planned, those who executed, and
those who continue it.”169 Yet in the face of this the Court both
sustained its constitutionality and praised it as an institution
conceived and implemented to cure “the embarrassments to
which the refusal to revive [the First Bank] exposed the
government.”170
These were then the actions of a Court that exhibited
considerable political and social courage in the midst of a
pervasive climate of distrust. Indeed, if anything, the protracted
and sometimes savage attacks mounted against both the decision
and Marshall in the months that followed—especially in the heart
166. Id. at 1406.
167. See G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70
VA. L. REV. 1, 1, 3 (1984).
168. Letter from Joseph Story to Mehitable Story (Mar. 7, 1819), in 1 LIFE AND
LETTERS, supra note 7, at 325.
169. Brutus, Calamities of Banking, Vulgar Abuse and Denunciation, WEEKLY
AURORA, Jan. 18, 1819, at 330.
170. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819).
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of state rights territory, his home state of Virginia—amply
supported Marshall’s observation that “[o]ur opinion in the bank
case has roused the sleeping spirit of Virginia . . . and will be
attacked in the papers with some asperity.” 171 M’Culloch must,
accordingly, be read and assessed in the light of these realities.

C. THE MISSOURI QUESTION
Marshall was of course aware of just how deeply certain
segments of the body politic resented the Bank and all it stood for.
As he stressed at the outset of his opinion, after summarizing the
issues before the Court:
No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep
sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility
involved in its decision.But it must be decided peacefully, or
remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of
a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by
this tribunal alone can the decision be made. 172

Marshall understood the significance of the questions before
the Court. But he also believed that the threshold issue, whether
Congress could actually create the Bank, was settled:
It has been truly said, that this can scarcely be considered as
an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former
proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now
contested was introduced at a very early period in our
history, has been [recognized] by many successive
legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial
department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of
undoubted obligation. 173

He placed special emphasis on the legislative proceedings and the
public response to the creation of the First and Second Banks,
noting that “[a]n exposition of the constitution, deliberately
established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense
property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly

171. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Mar. 24, 1819), in VIII THE P APERS
MARSHALL, 280, 280 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995). For a discussion of the
attacks, and Marshall’s own responses to them, see SECURING A NATION, supra note 5, at
123-58.
172. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400-01.
173. Id. at 401.
OF JOHN
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disregarded.”174 And he stressed the significance of the fact that
the Second Bank was created after “a short experience of the
embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First Bank]
exposed the government,”175 observing that “[i]t would require no
ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted
under these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to
which the constitution gave no countenance.” 176
The fact that Marshall included the judicial branch within the
list of those that had given their assent to the Bank is especially
noteworthy. He was not alone in this belief. Both Madison in his
1815 Veto and Representative Robert Wright of Maryland during
the 1816 debate had alluded to judicial approval of the Bank, each
without specifying what decisions they had in mind. 177 Marshall
now confirmed what the others had said: prior recognition of the
Bank as a proper party in cases before the Court offered tacit
recognition that Congress did indeed have the power to charter
the Bank.178
It is accordingly difficult to believe that Marshall thought
that the constitutionality of the Bank itself represented an issue on
which the fate of the nation rode. The hostility toward it at the
time, bolstered by the Spencer Committee Report, certainly made
its status controversial. But there was widespread agreement that
it was constitutional, a view that was even more significant given
prior decisions of the Court that had already affirmed both the
existence of implied powers and the need to defer to
congressional judgments about the necessity for federal action.
As Marshall stressed, it required “no ordinary share of
intrepidity” to question these basic constitutional principles. 179
Something more seemed to be afoot, and there was in fact
another issue being actively discussed at the time, within which a
newly robust doctrine of implied federal powers would be viewed
with alarm by individuals quite willing to argue in response that
they had a right to both defy the nation and, if necessary, to leave
174. Id.
175. Id. at 402.
176. Id.
177. See James Madison, Veto Message, in I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 555, 555 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896); 29
ANNALS OF CONG. 1340 (1816).
178. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
179. Id. at 402.
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it. That issue was slavery, with the particular manifestation of
that divisive matter the question of the status of Missouri.
Congressional debate about both slavery in general and
Missouri in particular were constant themes during the session,
especially in the House. In December, 1818 a resolution was
introduced that would allow Missouri to form a territorial
government in anticipation of its eventual admission to the
union.180 In early January, 1819, in turn, concerns were expressed
about individuals engaging in the slave trade, violating federal
law in ways that “demanded the interposition of Congress.” 181
The two issues were then linked on February 1, 1819, when an
amendment to the Missouri Territory measure was proposed that
would “substantially . . . limit the existence of slavery in the new
State, by declaring all free who should be born in the Territory
after its admission into the Union, and providing for the gradual
emancipation of those now held in bondage.”182 Extensive
debates on the paired questions then began on February 15th, just
one week before the Court would begin to hear arguments in
M’Culloch.183
The southern states harbored deep concerns about the ability
of Congress to impose conditions on the admission of new states,
believing “that Congress had no right to prescribe to any State the
details of its government, any further than that it should be
republican in its form.”184 Part of the argument against slavery
would in fact be that it was incompatible with that form of
government. Representative Timothy Fuller of Massachusetts,
for example, argued that “[t]he existence of slavery in any State
is so far a departure from republican principles,” citing the
Declaration of Independence, and declaring that “[s]ince, then, it
cannot be denied that slaves are men, it follows that they are in a
purely republican government born free, and are entitled to liberty
and the pursuit of happiness.” 185 These individuals also rejected
the idea that Congress had the authority to bar slavery from
national territories, maintaining that any such action “portend[ed]

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

33 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1818).
Id. at 442.
Id. at 1166.
See id. at 1169-94.
Id.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1180 (1819).
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destruction to the liberties of th[e] people, directly bearing on
their rights of property.”186 Neither power was mentioned in the
Constitution. But both would be countenanced by an expansive
reading of the text, in particular one sanctioning the existence of
implied powers and the notion that decisions about the necessity
for such matters were best left to the political process.
M’Culloch accordingly struck fear into the hearts of the proslavery factions on both counts. In Maryland, for example,
“Maryland planters knew well that if federal power reached far
enough outside constitutional bounds it might fall on slavery.”187
Indeed, Representative John W. Taylor of New York, possibly
anticipating that decision, emphasized that “Congress has no
power unless it be expressly granted by the Constitution, or
necessary to the execution of some power clearly delegated.”188
Post-decision reactions verified that the slavery issue was
front and center. Jefferson, for example, lamented, with
M’Culloch clearly on his mind, “[t]he steady tenor of the courts
of the United States to break down the constitutional barriers
between the co-ordinate powers of the States and of the Union”
in “a formal opinion lately given by five lawyers of too much
eminence.”189 He stressed that “nothing has ever presented so
threatening an aspect as what is called the Missouri question.” 190
Jefferson admittedly believed that this was primarily a political
maneuver designed to split the Republican Party in the election of
1820.191 Nevertheless, he recognized that it posed a distinct threat
to the institution of slavery, which now became “merely a
question of power,”192 observing that
186. Id. at 1195. This observation was made by John Scott of Missouri, who warned
against “the introduction . . . of any principle . . . the obvious tendency of which would be to
sow the seeds of discord in, and perhaps eventually endanger, the Union.” Id. See also
Brutus, The Bank System of Political Corruption, No. VI, WEEKLY AURORA, Mar. 22, 1819,
at 36 (stating that, “[t]his judgment forever annihilates the independency of the states, and
forever blasts the rights and liberties of the people.”).
187. ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634—1980 197
(1988).
188. Id. at 1171.
189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Dec. 26, 1820), in XII THE
WORKS OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON 185, 186 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter
Jefferson to Gallatin].
190. Id. at 186-87.
191.
See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 288-89 (1994).
192. Jefferson to Gallatin, supra note 189, at 187.
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if Congress once goes out of the Constitution to arrogate a
right of regulating the condition of the inhabitants of the
States, its majority may, and probably will, next declare that
the condition of all men with the United States shall be that
of freedom; in which case all the whites South of the
Potomac and Ohio must evacuate their States; and most
fortunate those who can do it first. And so far this crisis
seems to be advancing. 193

He took these questions up again in June, 1821, noting in a
letter to Spencer Roane that “I have read Colonel Taylor’s book
of ‘Constructions Construed,’ with great satisfaction, and, I will
say, with edification; for I acknowledge it corrected some errors
of opinion into which I had slidden without sufficient
examination.”194 That book, he declared,
is the most logical retraction of our governments to the
original and true principles of the Constitution creating them,
which has appeared since the adoption of that instrument. I
may not perhaps concur in all its opinions, great and small;
for no two men ever thought alike on so many points. But
on all its important questions, it contains the true political
faith, to which every catholic republican should steadfastly
hold.195

John Taylor was an ardent state rights advocate and prolific
spokesman for that position. 196 The book Jefferson praised,
Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated,197 was
nominally about M’Culloch. It examined the decision at great,
albeit often tedious length. But it was more than simply an attack
on “a mode of construction . . . introduced to advance the interests
of mercenary combinations.”198 It was rather, a conscious effort
to link M’Culloch to both the Missouri Question and slavery. As
Thomas Ritchie made clear in his prefatory remarks, “[t]he
Missouri Question is probably not yet closed. The principle, on
193.
194.

Id. at 187-88.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (June 27, 1821), in XV
JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 326, 327.
195. Id. at 327-28.
196. For a discussion of Taylor, his views, and his influence, see Benjamin F. Wright,
The Philosopher of Jeffersonian Democracy, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 870, 880-89 (1928).
197.
See generally JOHN T AYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND
CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED (Sheppard & Pollard 1820) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION
CONSTRUED].
198. Id. at 6.
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which it turns, is certainly not settled.”199 Taylor accordingly had
both a specific target, M’Culloch, and a wider aim, combating any
inference that M’Culloch meant that Congress could
appropriately resolve the questions posed by slavery.
Taylor’s general philosophy mirrored that of Jefferson and
his Republican allies. He complained, for example, of the “habit
of corrupting our political system, by the instrumentality of
inference, convenience and necessity.” 200 He believed that
sovereignty resided with “the people of each state, by whom it has
been and may be exercised” and does not belong “to the people
of the United States, by whom it never has been nor can be
exercised.”201 Banks in turn were evil. “A catalogue of the
immoral tendencies of banking ought to be awful to a republican
government, which many great writers assert to be incapable of
subsisting long, except by the preservation of virtuous
principles.”202
Taylor’s attacks on the Court were pointed. He asked, for
example, “[w]hich can do most harm to mankind, constrictive
treasons or constructive powers? The first takes away the life of
an individual, the second destroys the liberty of a nation. The
machine called inference can act as extensively in one case as in
the other.”203 And he excoriated Marshall for sanctioning the
notion of implied powers, observing:
As ends may be made to beget means, so means may be
made to beget ends, until the co-habitation shall rear a
progeny of unconstitutional bastards, which were not
begotten by the people; and their rights being no longer
secured by fixed principles, will be hazarded upon a game at
shuttlecock with ends and means, between the general and
state governments. To prevent this, means as well as ends
are subjected by our constitutions to a double restraint. The
first is special. In many instances, the means for executing
the powers bestowed, are defined, and by that definition,
limited. The other is general, and arises necessarily from the
division of powers; as it was never intended that powers
given to one department, or one government, should be
199. To the Publick, in Construction Construed, supra note 197, at i.
200. Construction Construed, supra note 197, at 2.
201. Id. at 121.
202. Id. at 183.
203. Id. at 22-23.
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impaired or destroyed, by the means used for the execution
of powers given to another. Otherwise, the indefinite word
‘means’ might defeat all labour expended upon definition by
our constitutions.204

Taylor argued that implied powers posed special risks for the
states. He believed that a proper understanding of the
Constitution meant that “[t]he ends with which [the federal and
state] governments are respectfully entrusted . . . have been
exclusively bestowed, and neither could constitutionally use its
legitimate ends, to defeat or absorb the legitimate ends assigned
to the other.”205 M’Culloch upset that balance. “If the means to
which the government of the union may resort for executing the
powers confided to it, are unlimited, it may easily select such as
will impair or destroy the powers confided to the state
governments.”206
Taylor’s observations on the subject of slavery were
especially telling, both for their support of each state’s right to
determine that issue and the extent to which he connected it to the
Bank and banking. He declared that:
[o]ne portion of the union is afflicted by negro slavery;
therefore, make it tributary to capitalists. Cultivation by
slaves is unprofitable; therefore, make it tributary to
capitalists. The freedom of labour deprives it of the benefit
of being directed by intelligence; therefore, subject it to
capitalists. Taxation is preferable to economy; therefore,
enhance it for the nourishment of capitalists, and the
gratification of avarice. 207

And he predicted the logical outcome of these matters in a passage
that would prove tellingly prescient:
Let us recite the succession of events. The great pecuniary
favour granted by congress to certificate-holders, begat
banking; banking begat bounties to manufacturing
capitalists; bounties to manufacturing capitalists begat an
oppressive pension list; these partialities united to begat the
Missouri project; that project begat the idea of using slavery
as an instrument for effecting a balance of power; when it is
204. Id. at 84.
205. Construction Construed, supra note 197, at 83.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 257 (internal quotations omitted).
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put in operation, it will beget new usurpations of internal
powers over persons and property, and these will beget a
dissolution of the union. 208

Taylor’s extensive discussion of M’Culloch and the
Missouri Question made it quite clear that state rights advocates,
in particular those in the slave-holding states, saw dangerous
parallels between Marshall’s expansive read on implied powers
and the ability of Congress to invoke that doctrine as the basis for
terminating the institution of slavery. In any such debate, Spencer
Roane stressed in a letter to Senator James Barbour of Virginia,
“[t]he decision of the Supreme Court will be the principal object;
as that claims a right to every thing possessed by the States.” 209
Roane agreed, and in the wake of a second Marshall opinion,
Cohens v. Virginia,210 took to the pages of the Richmond Enquirer
under the pseudonym Algernon Sydney to condemn decisions
that “completely negative[] the idea, that the American states
have a real existence, or are to be considered, in any sense, as
[sovereign] and independent states.”211 As part of these attacks,
Roane implied that slavery was not safe, declaring that the Court
had “exalted the dignity of a statute of the United States” and
“given a force” to them “in every State in the Union . . . to
supercede and repeal their most undoubted and salutary laws.”212
There are those who dispute this, arguing that linking
M’Culloch, Cohens, and slavery “make[] a superficial and
dubious connection between what are different and, in many
ways, disconnected strains of states’ rights thought.” 213 I
disagree. As I am about to note, M’Culloch gave an already

208. Id. at 298.
209. Letter from Spencer Roane to James Barbour (Dec. 29, 1819), reprinted in
Missouri Compromise, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 5,7 (1902); In February, 1820, Linn Banks, a
member of the Virginia House of Delegates, stressed that “[s]laves by our laws are
considered property.” Letter from Linn Banks to James Barbour (Feb. 20, 1820), reprinted
in Missouri Compromise, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 5, 20 (1901). He argued that recent events
suggested that there were those who believed that Congress “would have it in their power to
legislate exclusively for our property of every description” and that, if true, “would sound
the tocsin of freedom to every negro of the South.” Id. at 21.
210. See generally 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
211. Algernon Sydney, On the Lottery Decision, No. 1, RICHMOND ENQUIRER (May
25, 1821).
212. Id.
213. Ellis, supra note 2, at 140. Ellis also argues that John Taylor was an exception
who made only a “small attempt to link the two debates.” Id. at 141. That is simply wrong.
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recognized right of Congress to act on the basis of implied powers
new impetus. In particular, Marshall’s willingness to defer to
Congress regarding whether a given action or policy was
“necessary” placed a renewed emphasis on the balance of power
in a Congress that had already shown a willingness to restrict the
slave trade.214 The debate about Missouri, and its eventual
resolution via the Missouri Compromise, placed the question of
slavery front and center. It defies imagination to argue that
Marshall and his colleagues were somehow blithely unaware of
the potential impact of M’Culloch in those ongoing and bitter
disputes. Their contemporaries certainly did, and we cannot and
should not ignore the sentiments of individuals who believed that
M’Culloch might well “induce [Congress] to meddle with
forbidden fruit” such that “the essence of our political system will
be destroyed, and with it our vaunted residence in a region of
political fecundity.”215

III. INNOVATION, OR REPLICATION?
A final important contextual reality is that much of what
Marshall actually stated in M’Culloch had in fact been said
before, by the Court, in opinions Marshall himself wrote. These
decisions did more than simply acknowledging that the Bank
existed, and was presumably a constitutionally proper institution
that was a proper party in cases that came before the Court. 216
Rather, on at least three different occasions the Court
acknowledged the reality that federal power extended beyond
those narrow and specific grants of authority that were articulated
in the text.
The first of these was United State v. Fisher,217 in which
Marshall outlined much of what followed regarding the nature
and reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Fisher was a
214. See, e.g., An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves in Any Port or Place Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States, From and After the First Day of January, in the Year of
Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eight, 9th Cong., 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
215. Construction Construed, supra note 197, at 299.
216. See, e.g., 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1340 (1816) (noting “[T]he Supreme Judicial
tribunal had decided on its constitutionality by often recognizing it as a party, and it was now
too late to insist on the objection.”).
217. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
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bankruptcy action.218 The question before the Court was
“whether the United States, as holders of a protested bill of
exchange . . . are entitled to be preferred to the general creditors,
where the debtor becomes bankrupt?” 219 The Court held that it
was entitled to the preference, rejecting the contention that “[t]his
claim of priority on the part of the United States will . . . interfere
with the right of the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of
debts, and will defeat the measures they have a right to adopt to
secure themselves against delinquencies on the part of their own
revenue officers.”220
Marshall’s opinion reads like a primer for M’Culloch. He
began by noting that “[i]n the case at bar, the preference claimed
by the United States is not prohibited; but it has been truly said
that under a constitution conferring specific powers, the power
contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised.”221 His
response was pointed and prescient:
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers
vested by the constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.
In construing this clause it would be incorrect and would
produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be
maintained that no law was authorised which was not
indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it
might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary
because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress
must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered
to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise
of the power granted by the constitution. 222

Marshall dismissed the contention that the federal measure
“interfere[s] with the right of the state sovereignties respecting the
dignity of debts.”223 This was nothing more that “an objection to

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 396.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396.
Id. at 396-97.
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the constitution itself.”224 And he stated that “[t]he mischief
suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary
consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on
all subjects to which the legislative powers of congress
extends.”225 In other words, as he would subsequently declare, “a
government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their
execution.”226
The same approach was taken in a second case decided three
years later, The Bank of the United States v. DeVeaux (1809).227
This cause of action began when, ironically, the First Bank
refused to pay a tax that the state of Georgia attempted to levy on
its stock.228 Writing for the Court, Marshall stated that “that the
right to sue” conferred on the Bank in its original charter “does
not imply a right to sue in the courts of the union, unless it be
expressed.”229 Emphasizing that the citizenship of a corporation
us determined by “the character of the individuals who
compose[]” it,”230 the Court held that it had no jurisdiction. The
Bank could not bring a federal question action, since the statutes
in question did not authorize it to do so. 231 It also could not
maintain one in diversity, which required that no party from one
side of the dispute could be from the same state as any of the
opposing parties. 232
Marshall did not discuss whether the Bank itself was
constitutional in DeVeaux. But he did lay the foundations for key
aspects of what was to follow, observing that “[a] constitution,
from its nature, deals in generals, not in detail. Its framers cannot
perceive minute distinctions which arise in the progress of the
nation, and therefore confine it to the establishment of broad and

224. Id. at 397.
225. Id.
226. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
227. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
228. See id. at 63.
229. Id. at 86.
230. Id. at 90.
231. See id. at 86.
232. The Court had announced that rule three years earlier in Strawbridge v. Curtis,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), when it held that that was what Congress intended when it
implemented diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.

74

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

general principles.”233 That formulation did not, obviously, have
the ring or staying power of Marshall’s subsequent admonition
that “[a] constitution” cannot “partake of the prolixity of a legal
code.”234 But it does tell us that much of M’Culloch is not
original.
Finally, both federal supremacy and the reality of implied
powers were major themes in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.235 Two
questions were posed in this litigation. The first was whether the
State of Virginia could confiscate land owned by individuals who
remained loyal to the Crown during the Revolution and then
convey it to third parties.236 The Virginia Court of Appeals
upheld the state actions, arguing that the 1783 and 1794 treaties
that ended the war and resolved outstanding issues did not
apply.237 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Story, 238 disagreed,
stating that “we are well satisfied that the treaty of 1794
completely protects and confirms that title of Denny Fairfax; even
admitting that the [1783] treaty of peace left him wholly
unprovided for.”239
The Virginia Court of Appeals then “refus[ed] . . . to obey
the mandate of th[e C]ourt,” 240 believing that “the appellate
power of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend
to this court.”241 The Court, again speaking through Justice Story,
disagreed. The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly provided for
appellate review of “any suit, in the highest court of law or equity
of a State in which decision in the suit could be had, where is
drawn in question the validity of a treaty . . . and the decision is
against [its] validity.”242 The Court had jurisdiction, and its
mandate must be obeyed:
The courts of the United States can, without question, revise
the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities
of the states, and if they are found to be contrary to the

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity.
Surely the exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals
is not a higher or more dangerous act of sovereign power.243

Indeed, review of state court decisions was essential:
If there were no revising authority to control . . . jarring and
discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity,
the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states, and might,
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. 244

The more telling aspects of Martin for current purposes are
the principles it espoused regarding the nature of Congressional
authority and the terms of the Constitution itself. As a threshold
matter, Story, consistent with both Fisher and DeVeaux,
emphasized that “[t]he government . . . of the United States, can
claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution,
and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly
given, or given by necessary implication.” 245 The Constitution,
he emphasized, “unavoidably deals in general language. It did
not suit the purposes of the people . . . to provide for minute
specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which
those powers should be carried into execution.” 246 Congress in
turn, has substantial discretion regarding when and how both its
express and implied powers are to be exercised:
Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to
the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to
effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the
exercise of its powers, as to its own wisdom, and the public
interests, should require. 247

The Constitution was both a general and adaptable charter.
“The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse
of ages.”248 It was, accordingly, essential that it be viewed as a
document whose meaning and proper applications evolved over
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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time: “It could not be foreseen what new changes and
modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the
general objects of the charter; and restrictions and specifications,
which, at the present, might seem salutary, might, in the end,
prove the overthrow of the system itself.” 249
Each of these statements has its counterpart in M’Culloch.
That decision’s articulation of the principles of implied powers
and deference to congressional judgments about necessity did not,
accordingly, break new ground. Rather, Marshall simply
reiterated and repackaged prior precedents without
acknowledging their existence. I leave to others whether that
diminishes the stature of the decision. I would disagree with any
such judgment in the light of the overall nature and content of
Marshall’s opinion. In particular, I regard what he penned as
uncommonly eloquent and significant in the light of the
circumstances and events within which he wrote it.

CONCLUSION
From the very beginning, everyone knew that M’Culloch
was an important case. As indicated, 250 in December, 1818
Justice Story wrote Court Reporter Henry Wheaton, noting that
M’Culloch was one of the matters pending that would “probably”
make the “next term of the Supreme Court . . . the most
interesting ever known.”251 The other two cases he mentioned,
Dartmouth College and Sturgis, would also become important
parts of the Court’s 1819 legacy. But M’Culloch would
eventually occupy center stage, capturing the imagination of the
Justices, the general public, and a legion of commentators that
cared deeply about the issues posed by and the implications of the
Court’s decision.
That narrow perspective is unfortunate. Both Dartmouth
College and Sturges deserve attention as key elements in a
protracted process within which Marshall and his fellow justices
articulated a vision of a Constitution “of complete obligation
249. Id.; Cf. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (“This provision is made in a
constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.”).
250. See supra note 7.
251. Life and Letters, supra note 7, at 313.
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[that] bound the State sovereignties.” 252 In a similar vein, many
contemporary events made a decision in favor of the Bank and
implied powers remarkable, given the economic and social
conditions at the time, the Court’s support for an institution
widely reviled, and its willingness to countenance a robust policymaking role for Congress in the face of strong regional fears about
how such powers might be exercised.
The project that Marshall and his colleagues were
undertaking neither began nor ended with M’Culloch. It was
gradual. It started in 1803 with the Court’s declaration that it
mattered and would fully exercise the judicial power in Marbury
v. Madison.253 It progressed over the years in Fisher, DeVeaux,
and Martin, which laid the foundations for M’Culloch. And it
continued in M’Culloch’s wake, articulated in decisions like
Cohens v. Virginia,254 Gibbons v. Ogden,255 and Osborn v. The
President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United
States.256
That quest was temporarily derailed by John Marshall’s
replacement by Roger Brooke Taney and by decades of cases that
embraced a particularly crabbed vision of the Constitution, cases
within which, for example, the Court fixated on highly artificial
distinctions regarding intra- versus interstate commerce in the
face of Marshall’s nuanced understanding of that federal
power.257 M’Culloch only became totemic, accordingly, more
than a hundred years after the decision was announced. It initially
gained ascendency in the wake of anniversary observances of
John Marshall’s tenure. It then emerged as a centerpiece in the
judicial revolution crafted in response to the Roosevelt
administration’s statutory and regulatory responses to the
problems posed by the Great Depression. Those realities do not,
however, diminish its stature, nor do they require that we reject
the lessons it imparts.
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256. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819, 821, 823 (1824).
257. I discuss the unfortunate manner in which the Court incorrectly parsed Gibbons
in Mark R. Killenbeck, A Prudent Regard to Our Own Good? The Commerce Clause, in
Nation and States, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 281, 290-91, 293, 297-98 (2013).

